THE U.S. GETS OUT OF AFGHANISTAN: FIRST, HOW DID WE GET IN?

 

The United States is out of Afghanistan. On August 30 the last transport plane carrying American military personnel and equipment, U.S. citizens, and Afghan allies lifted off from  Kabul

International Airport. After twenty years and at a cost of  2500 U.S. military lives, 1200 soldiers from allied countries, 3900 contractors, 111,000 Afghans (31,000 of them civilians), and $2 trillion, the United States is done.

The Biden administration took a lot of heat for the
exit. Future investigations will determine if could have been done better. Polls showed Americans in favor of leaving, but the president’s approval rating dipped in light of the grim pictures of civilians
exit. Future investigations will determine if could have been done better. Polls showed Americans in favor of leaving, but the president’s approval rating dipped in light of the grim pictures of civiliansclinging to U.S. military aircraft at the Kabul airport. Republicans pounced on the optics and slammed Biden for how he handled the end game, ignoring the fact former President Donald Trump, before leaving office, set a deadline for an even earlier American departure.

We think the exit presents a topic for another time.

Today, and in posts that will come later, we focus on the way the United States got involved in Afghanistan, how and why we stayed as long as we did, and what lessons the  experience teaches. The issue involves fundamental principles of constitutional law, foreign policy, and the American role in the world.

                                    

The Legal Framework for War

America’s constitution provides a specific process for going to war. Since the end of the Second World War, it’s never been followed. Article I, Section 8, Clause 11 gives Congress the power to declare

war. Though Article II, Section 2 makes the president Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, Congress, not the executive, was supposed to have authority to involve the country in wars.

Why has this happened? First, Congress let

it happen. That’s what occurred with Afghanistan. President George W. Bush, after the September 11, 2001, terror attacks on New York and Washington, sought and received from Congress  what’s called an Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF). It wasn’t a

declaration of war against a specific country, but a grant of authority that the president could use “all necessary and appropriate force” against those who planned and carried out the attacks.

The measure passed 98-0 in the Senate and with 

one dissenting vote – California’s Barbara Lee – in the House of Representatives. Lee said she voted ‘no’ not because she thought a military response was unwarranted, but because she believed the broadly worded AUMF provided a blank check for endless conflict. The record shows her foresight. Besides being the 

basis for two decades

of U.S. involvement in Afghanistan, by 2016, that AUMF had been cited 37 times as a justification for military actions in 14 countries and on the high seas. Presidents from both parties used it in justifying their actions -- Bush 18 times, Barack Obama 19 times.

 

An Old Movie

The story of how the U.S. got involved in, and stayed, in Afghanistan so long seems uncomfortably familiar. The Korean War was never declared. American troops participated as part of a United Nations “police action.”  Seventy years later, we still have 28,500 military personnel in Korea. We understand the South Koreans want us there and we recognize that perhaps we have strategic interests we didn’t have in Afghanistan. There was, however, no declaration of war and we’ve stayed a long time. Those are just the facts.

Vietnam was different, but in degree, not kind.

Congress didn’t declare war. It authorized the use of military force in response to an incident involving an American ship in the Gulf of Tonkin. President Lyndon Johnson used that authorization as a basis for sending over half a million U.S. troops into a civil war that had been grinding on in South Vietnam for years. We stayed until we lost, at a cost of 58,220 U.S. military lives and $168 billion (a trillion in today’s dollars).

Our more recent involvements in the first Gulf War (Desert Storm) and the 2003 invasion of Iraq haven’t been different.  Those were presidential operations, accompanied by some kind of congressional authorization that amounted to a rubber stamp of what the president wanted. In neither case did Congress declare war. Desert Storm ended quickly, but Iraq dragged on and on. We still have 2500 troops there.

 

The Failure of Limits

As we’ll note in coming posts, Congress has tried reigning in the ability of presidents to wage war by themselves. In 1973, it passed the War Powers Act which seeks a balance between congressional oversight of the country’s involvement in war and

the commander-in-chief role the constitution gives the chief executive.  The president must tell Congress within 48 hours when he or she has ordered U.S. military forces into action and requires removal of troops from that involvement after 60 days if Congress hasn’t declared war or otherwise authorized the operation.  

This hasn’t worked. The statute has never ended a foreign military operation.  The 60-day time limit has rarely been triggered. Presidents from both ends of the ideological spectrum have ignored it -- Ronald Reagan in his El Salvador intervention, Bill Clinton in Kosovo, and Barack Obama in Libya.

How we got into and stayed in Afghanistan may well represent a case study in the way presidents violate both the constitution and the War Powers Act. We’ll dive into that question when we pick up this topic in our next post.          

THE STRANGE CASE OF DONALD TRUMP AND THE DEFENSE PRODUCTION ACT: A WAR TIME PRESIDENT WHO WON’T PULL OUT ALL THE STOPS TO WIN THE WAR

President Trump’s dance with the Defense Production Act of 1950 (DPA) makes us

wonder why he hasn’t embraced the DPA in getting ventilators and other protective equipment in the hands of those battling the coronavirus. In a March 18 Executive Order, Trump declared ventilators and protective equipment

“essential to the national defense” against the spread of the virus, the standard required by the DPA for production and distribution of critically needed equipment. The range of explanations spans a continuum from benign to cynical.  The

shortage of medical equipment compels a closer look at what’s happened.

The DPA gives a president broad powers that potentially could alleviate shortages. Trump doesn’t lack awareness of the law. He’s spoken, however, of “hopefully” not needing it against the virus and using it only in a “worst-case scenario.” The fact the nation now has more coronavirus cases than any other country sounds like a “worst-case scenario.”  

                                     

                     

Some History

The DPA’s roots rest in the Second World War. Congress gave President Franklin

Roosevelt broad authority for ordering that industry convert facilities and produce war material. When the Korean War started, President Harry Truman needed

Image Courtesy Wikimedia Commons

similar power. Congress enacted the DPA, a law that has been reauthorized over 50 times and has been regularly invoked since. Trump claimed the coronavirus pandemic makes him a “wartime president,” though, mysteriously, he’s not using all available resources for winning the war. 

The DPA gives presidents three kinds of power: (1) authority requiring that businesses accept and prioritize government contracts deemed necessary for national defense; (2) power for establishing regulations that allocate materials, services, and facilities for national defense; and (3) authority for managing the civilian economy assuring access to scarce materials for defense needs. Trump seemingly thinks the federal

government has only a limited role in the war since he declared the federal government isn’t a “shipping clerk.” Trump has acted as if each state is an independent nation, left to fend for itself. 

 

Trump, the Virus, and the DPA

General Motors, Medtronic, ResMed, Royal Philips, and Vyaire Medical could produce

essential supplies. None have shown enthusiasm at the prospect. Each, if ordered to produce essential supplies, could do so and, of course, would want a large share of the $2.2 trillion CARES bailout Congress passed and the president signed March 27.

The most visible company in the discussion, General Motors, could shift factories from building automobile engines to building ventilators. Trump’s order didn’t immediately require that GM convert to ventilator production.  GM, in fact, said it was going ahead with plans for manufacturing ventilators, but reportedly wanted $1 billion for doing so, millions of it upfront. A dispute over costs erupted between GM and the administration and discussions broke off. A bit later Trump said he’d use the DPA in requiring that General Motors accept and prioritize contracts for ventilators, the number being determined by the Secretary of Health and Human Services. 

Trump came under fire from House Speaker Nancy Pelosi for his reluctance to use the

DPA. He finally, on April 2, said he was invoking the law and requiring that three companies – 3M, General Electric, and Medtronic – produce masks. Even GOP Senator Ted Cruz of Texas urged that Trump “exercise these delegated powers to the full extent necessary.”  Trump, however, hasn’t ordered that General Motors,

or any of the other companies, begin production of other needed materials and has even gone so far as saying invoking the DPA would effectively “nationalize” firms. We find Trump’s reluctance about invoking the DPA baffling and he hasn’t explained his reasons.  Still, we have some ideas.

A Range of Possibilities

We start with the most benign potential reason. Imagining any president hesitating about injecting the government into the business of private companies isn’t difficult. Democrats and Republicans say they believe

in limited government. Staying out of a firm’s decisions about what it will produce, when, and at what price comports with that philosophy. Republican orthodoxy mandates that the government avoid intrusion into the operational life of private business as much as possible (tax cuts notwithstanding). We see this explanation near one end of a benign-to-cynical continuum.

Nearer the middle of that continuum, we

might suggest a political rationale. Perhaps, Trump fears antagonizing his political base if he strongly and enthusiastically uses the DPA. Many are true believers in Republican orthodoxy, despite their willingness to feed from the $2.2 trillion CARES trough. These supporters would likely regard any deviation from the party’s antigovernment norm as heresy, punishable in right wing media (and maybe at the ballot box). When Trump strayed a little from the line and sought a compromise with Democrats on his border wall, howls from Rush Limbaugh and Laura Ingraham forced his hand and he backed off the compromise idea.

                  

On the far end of the continuum, Trump might just be appeasing friends in the industry. If he goes all-in with using the DPA in forcing production of large amounts of different materials, imagining that he will ruffle the feathers of friends in the manufacturing world follows. Could the president simply want protection for his captains-of-industry colleagues from costs associated with converting their operations to producing medical equipment? Is Trump putting the interests of his friends above what is best for the country right now?

It’s possible Trump’s reluctance springs from a combination of the factors we’ve identified and others. His real reasons could cover our

entire continuum. The mounting death toll and the need for addressing the health needs of millions of Americans, however, suggests using every tool in the box, including the DPA.